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Abstract
Research summary: How firms respond to the emer-
gence of dominant platforms that undermine their
competitiveness remains a strategic puzzle. Our longi-
tudinal study shows how one incumbent, Cisco,
responded to such a challenge by creating a new plat-
form, Fog, without undermining the dominant plat-
form, Cloud, where it played a complementor role. By
developing a process model we reveal how a firm in a
peripheral role in a platform ecosystem can reposition
itself through a dynamic mix of material, symbolic and
institutional actions to develop and legitimize an alter-
native platform. This can be done first through symbio-
sis with the dominant platform, then partial
competition with it. We theorize the value of a mutual-
istic “rising tide lifts all boats” strategy in contrast to
hostile “winner takes all” approaches.
Managerial summary: The increasing pervasiveness
of digital platforms are driving established firms to
reboot their strategy to embrace emergent forms of
competition, collaboration, and mutual coexistence.
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Fearing disruption in their traditional business models,
firms may decide to jump into the platform game. How-
ever, this is not straightforward since they do not want
to go head-to-head with existing platforms and alienate
their partners and customers by being perceived as
encroaching on their turf. We describe one way that
established technology firms are overcoming this
dilemma through a “rising-tide-lifts-all-boats” strategy
to cultivate new platforms. We show the value of seem-
ingly inconsistent and dynamic approaches toward stra-
tegic communication and investments firm can use to
lead new platforms without facing backlash from
others.
KEYWORD S
Cloud and Edge computing, digital transformation, platform
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Established firms increasingly face the challenge of having to make up lost ground when they
have been left behind by a new technological development (Ansari & Krop, 2012; Christensen &
Bower, 1996; Danneels, Verona, & Provera, 2018; Eggers & Park, 2018; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000).
Digital technologies and platforms have amplified these challenges (Cusumano, Gawer, &
Yoffie, 2019; Thomas, Autio, & Gann, 2014; Van Alstyne, Parker, & Choudary, 2016) and have
left many incumbents either disadvantaged (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2011;
Gawer, 2014), disrupted (e.g., Kumaraswamy, Garud, & Ansari, 2018), or struggling to grow at
the rates that markets expect (Benner & Ranganathan, 2017; Greve, 1998). While a few studies
have examined these challenges (e.g., Cozzolino, Verona, & Rothaermel, 2018; Seamans &
Zhu, 2013), we still know little about how incumbents respond strategically to prevalent plat-
forms in which they are not leaders.
When the odds are against a firm being able to assume a leadership position in a dominant
platform ecosystem, it may respond by joining the platform to capture value; Toys R Us joined
Amazon, for example, rather than creating its own online distribution channel (Zhu &
Liu, 2018). This can potentially lead to deterioration of the firm's core capabilities and prevent
it from having a voice in the platform's architecture (Baldwin, 2018; Jacobides, MacDuffie, &
Tae, 2016; Schilling, 2009). A more competitive response might be to create a new platform by
either acquiring a platform (e.g., IBM acquiring Red-Hat to provide hybrid Cloud platforms) or
establishing its own platform—as Apple did with iOS—using technology leapfrogging, for
example, (Schilling, 2003). The risk here is that it may fail to outcompete or “dethrone” the rival
platform, despite extensive investments (Cusumano et al., 2019; Suarez & Kirtley, 2012). In this
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paper, we study how an incumbent firm in networking, Cisco, attempted to reconcile these
risks when formulating its platform strategy.
Although creating an alternative platform based on a firm's strengths may seem like an
appealing strategic choice for an established firm trying to regain leadership in a platform eco-
system (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Iansiti & Levien, 2004; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011), it is
hard to compete against dominant platforms protected by strong barriers (Katz &
Shapiro, 1985; Klemperer, 1987). Moreover, creating a new platform requires not just develop-
ing a distinctive and novel value proposition, but also ensuring that the platform is perceived as
legitimate by powerful actors, who may resist or reject a new platform unless it aligns with the
prevalent platform (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Masucci, Brusoni, & Cennamo, 2020; Ozalp &
Kretschmer, 2019; Zhu & Iansiti, 2012). This legitimacy challenge is compounded when the
established firm also needs to safeguard its position and stay legitimate within an existing plat-
form ecosystem from which it also benefits.
Our interest in how incumbents respond to a dominant platform emerged inductively dur-
ing research on the rise of Cloud computing. At that time, Cisco was a hardware complementor
to leading firms in the rapidly growing category of Cloud platform ecosystems (e.g., Amazon
Web Services, AWS, the market leader in public cloud) based on a centralized computing archi-
tecture (managing data using central servers instead of onsite hardware). However, rapid
growth in the “Internet of things” (IoT) (connected devices) fueled the need for decentralized
data processing closer to devices. Hardware companies saw an opportunity to lead this funda-
mental shift in the computing paradigm and to regain “lost territory” from Cloud leaders
(Economist, 2018) through a range of technologies broadly referred to as Edge computing.
Leveraging its core strengths, Cisco created a decentralized technology platform, Fog (managing
data via distributed “mini-clouds” located near the physical devices), while remaining a viable
complementor in the Cloud ecosystem.
Our study provides three contributions at the intersection of platform ecosystems and strate-
gic management (Jacobides, Cennamo, & Gawer, 2018; McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017). First, by
examining how an incumbent in a peripheral position in an established platform category cre-
ates a new platform to reposition itself as a leader (Wang & Shaver, 2014), we theorize a mutu-
alistic “rising tide lifts all boats” (Chen & Miller, 2015) platform creation strategy that contrasts
with more hostile or predatory “winner takes all” approaches, where value is derived at the
expense of others (Cennamo & Santalo, 2013). Drawing on ecologists' notions of symbiosis and
commensalism in interpopulation relations (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Barnett & Carroll, 1987;
Hawley, 1950), we show how instead of trying to compete head to head, the new platform crea-
tor first complements the existing platform to gain a footing, and then switches to partial com-
petition, once the platform has gathered steam. Second, by explaining the dual legitimacy
challenges that arise from participating in interrelated ecosystems (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006), we
show how a firm resolves a key dilemma: how to legitimize a new platform among targeted
members and, at the same time, neutralize resistance from powerful players in the existing plat-
form in order to protect its ongoing business. Third, our processual view of creating a new plat-
form without attempting to undermine an existing platform shifts the focus from competitive
dynamics at a given point in time to processual dynamics over time. We reveal the value of
deploying a dynamic mix of symbolic and material actions to reconcile the strategic tensions
(Kunisch, Bartunek, Mueller, & Huy, 2017) that arise in the process of initiating and expanding
a platform.
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2 | THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Creating a new platform is one option for established firms that have lost ground to a growing
wave of platforms, from firm-specific (e.g., Facebook in social media) to industry-wide (e.g., 5G
in communications; Thomas et al., 2014) that involve multiple companies and consortia
(Gawer & Cusumano, 2008; Tiwana, Konsynski, & Bush, 2010). While creating a de novo plat-
form is an uphill battle for any firm, it becomes particularly challenging for an established firm
that has stakes in the existing platform ecosystem (Bennett, Seamans, & Zhu, 2015) as a client,
partner, or complementor and does not want to undermine its position in that ecosystem. For
instance, when an infrastructure leader such as Ericsson is aspiring to create a new digital plat-
form (e.g., in transportation), it seeks legitimacy in the new ecosystem by providing distinct
value but it does not want to undermine its legitimacy in its existing ecosystem where its key
customers (e.g., a mobile operator) are targeting the same market (Khanagha, Ramezan Zadeh,
Mihalache, & Volberda, 2018).
To avoid the new platform being rejected, the company needs to legitimize it among
targeted adopters (Vasudeva, Spencer, & Teegen, 2013), while also preserving legitimacy in the
existing ecosystem (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006) on which it also depends. Gaining legitimacy matters,
as the very concept of an ecosystem is based on the idea that every organism is interdependent
on other organisms within the system and gaining acceptance from them is therefore crucial
(Moore, 1996). To secure legitimacy, a platform creator needs to identify opportunities for
mutual coexistence, whereby the new platform enhances the viability of the dominant platform.
Ecological concepts (Mars & Bronstein, 2018; Moore, 1993, 1996) are highly germane to under-
standing the increasingly complex relationships in interdependent ecosystems. Drawing on
Hawley (1950), Barnett & Carroll (1987 p. 401) described two distinct bases for such relation-
ships: “symbiosis” and “commensalism.” While symbiosis is a purely mutualistic approach,
where organizations provide complementary value by targeting nonoverlapping market niches,
“commensalistic relationships range from full competition, through neutrality, to full mutual-
ism” (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006, p. 245). Thus, while commensalism can include cooperation, it has
been argued that the “most common expression of commensalism is competition (Aldrich &
Ruef, 2006, p. 43).” This includes partial competition, where organizations target market niches
that overlap to some extent (Dobrev & Kim, 2006).
In pursuing legitimacy, a platform creator needs to assure targeted adopters that there will
be enough users and complementors. It must also convince them that the platform offers novel
value and differentiated functionalities that will meet user needs that are underserved by the
existing platform (Jacobides et al., 2018). To alleviate fears about possible lock-in, it may also
need to reassure potential members about the platform's openness, while also maintaining the
required level of control to capture value (Boudreau, 2010). The new platform needs to show a
sufficient degree of familiarity and alignment with the existing platform, because if it is per-
ceived to be too novel, distinctive, or disconnected, cognitive legitimacy may be hard to gain
(Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Ozalp & Kretschmer, 2019; Zhao, Fisher, Lounsbury, &
Miller, 2017). In addition, misalignment may draw resistance from members of the dominant
platform, especially if there are clashes with that platform's technological architecture
(Henderson & Clark, 1990) or threats to its dominance (Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002).
However, ensuring familiarity may also undermine the platform's distinctive value (Zunino,
Suarez, & Groda, 2019). Thus, when a platform creator still has dependencies on an existing
platform ecosystem, contradictory strategies will often be needed to secure legitimacy in both
the established and the emerging ecosystem.
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In this situation, material actions such as making investments to signal credible commit-
ment (Schilling, 2003) or forming ties with prominent actors (Vasudeva, Nachum, & Say, 2018)
are vital, as are objective platform properties such as technological design and functionalities,
but a firm also has opportunities to reinforce these through symbolic actions. This is because
the technology is still emerging, and a firm has more scope to shape favorable perceptions of
the platform by using nonmaterial assets (e.g., strong reputation) (ibid., 2003) and symbolic
actions to assuage the concerns of existing stakeholders. Identifying the optimal level of open-
ness and familiarity are important concerns in terms of legitimacy. Addressing these may
require not only material actions, but also symbolic actions and framing to shape stakeholders'
perceptions favorably (e.g., Gray, Purdy, & Ansari, 2015; Suarez, Grodal, & Gotsopoulos, 2015).
To frame is to increase the saliency of an entity and to promote particular, often desirable,
aspects (Entman, 1993). For instance, Facebook has tried to frame its new cryptocurrency Libra
not as “a threat to the sovereignty of nations” but as a means of “defending the Free World
from China.” Indeed, symbolic actions can be used to help new initiatives gain legitimacy
among ecosystem actors (Ansari, Garud, & Kumaraswamy, 2016; Snihur, Thomas, &
Burgelman, 2018).
Symbolic and material actions work in consort but can be either congruent, resonating with
one another, or compensatory, offsetting one another (Westphal & Zajac, 2001). For instance,
when TiVo, a platform creator in the television industry, faced resistance from industry incum-
bents on whom it depended, it reframed itself as a complementary “connector,” rather than as
a “disruptor,” in order to atone for undermining advertising business models (Ansari
et al., 2016). Similarly, Microsoft often frames its application programming interfaces (APIs) as
open but promotes the seamless integration of features across these applications to make them
exclusive (Cusumano et al., 2019).
Finally, the platform evolution process has an inherent temporal dimension (Rietveld,
Schilling, & Bellavitis, 2019; Teece, 2017), since changes and developments emerge as the firm
tries to scale the platform. As the platform evolves, so too do user needs, complementors' roles
(Gretz & Basuroy, 2013; Rietveld & Eggers, 2018) and the technology itself (Suarez, 2004). This
is especially so in fast-changing technology markets. In addition, existing platforms may plug
the gaps and may themselves incorporate the added value of the new platform through genera-
tional transitions (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017), for example. Also, since the firm is active in multi-
ple platform ecosystems with reciprocal relationships and plays varying roles in each (Pierce,
2009), coopetitive tensions have a temporal dimension—collaborative relationships may turn
competitive and vice versa (Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2018). In order to create and capture value,
a firm thus needs to dynamically manage coopetition in two ecosystems—collaborating and
complementing versus competing and substituting (Ansari et al., 2016; Chen & Miller, 2015)—
at different times. Also, legitimacy issues evolve (Fisher, Kotha, & Lahiri, 2016; Schilling, 1998),
and at various points a firm may seek both to conform with existing understandings and expec-
tations and to create as a unique and distinctive identity in order to gain legitimacy (e.g., Zhao
et al., 2017). This requires dynamic adaptation of symbolic and material strategies. For instance,
a platform may be opened up to spur wider adoption (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van
Alstyne, 2009) or control may be tightened to capture value, and platform creators need to
decide which of these two approaches may be more feasible, and when. Finally, material and
symbolic actions in the initial stages, such as exerting technical control or developing a distinc-
tive identity (e.g., being recognized as the platform leader), can have “lingering” cognitive
effects beyond the initial period of deployment (Wittman, 2019). These carryover effects can
enable managers to favorably influence stakeholder perceptions in subsequent periods.
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A platform creator cannot anticipate all these twists and turns upfront when seeding the
platform, and some strategies only emerge as the platform adapts to evolving market needs dur-
ing scaling. We thus need to understand the dynamic deployment of material and symbolic
strategies.
3 | RESEARCH SETTING AND METHOD
Founded in 1984 by pioneers of the local area network (LAN) concept, Cisco is a leading pro-
vider of telecommunications and networking equipment (nodes, routers, and switches). In 2009
the emergence of cloud computing, based on a centralized architecture (Khanagha, Volberda, &
Oshri, 2014, 2017, provided growth opportunities for Cisco, but only as a complementor; it pro-
vided few opportunities for it to become a leader. Later, phenomenal growth in data generated
from “smart” connected devices (IoT) gave Cisco an opportunity to revalorize its capabilities.
To do so, it established a computing technology platform called Fog to address the emergent
IoT market that was also being targeted by Cloud platform leaders, and other hardware compa-
nies like Cisco that were producing their own Edge computing variants. As we aim at nascent
theory generation (Edmondson & McManus, 2007) to examine platform strategies, we con-
ducted a longitudinal, field-based case study. We adopted a historical process research approach
to data collection and analysis (Langley, 1999) to explore an established firm's platform creation
efforts. In line with prior research (Danneels, 2011; Joseph & Ocasio, 2012; Paroutis &
Heracleous, 2013), our processual view reveals key actions and intermediary phases that are
likely to be missed in other methodological approaches. Specifically, we studied Cisco's activi-
ties between 2008 and 2019, a period characterized by the rise of cloud computing and the
emergence of fog computing.
3.1 | Data collection
We gathered data from three sources: (a) three rounds of semistructured interviews with man-
agers at Cisco and other manufacturers affected by cloud computing, conducted between
September 2010 and September 2013, September 2017 and December 2017, and February 2019
and July 2019; (b) participant observations between July 2015 and December 2018 (see
Figure 1); and (c) archival materials, such as presentations at OpenFog Consortium meetings
and conferences.
3.1.1 | Interviews and observations
Between 2011 and 2013, we conducted 32 interviews with companies affected by cloud comput-
ing (Cisco, Intel and Ericsson, as well as Cisco's customers and complementors). We inter-
viewed senior managers, experienced professional analysts from technology and service
providers, and complementors. In 2015, we secured access to the OpenFog Consortium and par-
ticipated in meetings to acquire first-hand insights and interact with senior managers and
experts from Cisco and other consortium members. On six occasions, we met OpenFog Consor-
tium members for group discussion sessions and conducted 9 formal interviews. We also fre-
quently interacted with OpenFog board members and conducted 32 informal interviews.
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3.1.2 | Archival data
We extracted analyst reports, news, and events relating to fog and cloud computing from two
databases (Factiva and LexisNexis). We collected and transcribed publicly available presenta-
tions by Cisco CEOs and analysts' conference calls to trace Cisco's strategic challenges and
responses. We used memos and observations from several years of research on cloud and fog
computing strategies. See Table 1 for data sources, and Figure 1 for a timeline of our data
collection.
3.2 | Data analysis
First, we used content analysis to make sense of the data from multiple sources and we orga-
nized the data chronologically. We created a timeline of events relating to fog computing from
January 2008 to July 2019. Second, we used open coding to identify and group relevant concepts
into categories, and then axial coding to investigate the connections between the existing cate-
gories (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2012). We categorized raw data as first-order concepts and
drew on second-order categories to develop our theoretical model of the temporal dimensions
of platform development strategies. After every iteration, the exploratory findings and emergent
themes identified by one author would be presented to the others, who acted as “outsiders.”
This enabled us to refine our analytical schemes (Evered & Louis, 1981). Third, we focused on
disentangling the relationships between our aggregate dimensions to build a model explaining
how an established firm initiated and scaled a new platform ecosystem. Specifically, we used
“temporal bracketing” (Langley, 1999) to identify the effects of opposing forces that led to
changes in platform strategies.
To ensure that our findings were trustworthy, we used: (a) prolonged engagement in the
field, including presentation of our emergent interpretations to two managers' groups at the
OpenFog Consortium and at a large technology company (Lincoln & Guba, 1985); (b) both ret-
rospective and real-time data (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) from several sources for triangula-
tion, including spontaneous feedback on several presentations at major conferences attended by
members of the cloud and fog ecosystems; and (c) thick description, and informant and outsider
20
08
Rise of Cloud computing 
and commoditization of 
networking equipment
20
13
Cisco registers 
Fog computing 
trademark
20
20
Peripheral role in Cloud, 
shrinking profit margins 
in Cisco’s core business
20
15
Initiating Fog as an 
exclusive platform that 
complements Cloud
OpenFog consortium 
established
Participant observations
Semi-structured interviews
20
11
First Fog conference and pilot 
of industrial applications
Expanding Fog as an 
inclusive platform that 
competes with Cloud
OpenFog reference 
architecture and surge 
in adoption of Fog
Participant observations
Semi-structured interviews
FIGURE 1 Timeline of events and data collection activities
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TABLE 1 Data sources
Data
sources Details Purpose Analysis of data
Field observations and
participation
Four years of close
interaction with the
OpenFog Consortium
In-depth understanding of
the field and related
trends. Informal
conversations and
participation in meetings
and discussions
Field notes
were used
to support
the
development of first-order
and second-order
constructs.
Archival
data
- All news and other hits from
the Factiva and LexisNexis
databases that referred to
Fog and Edge, 2013–2019.
- Presentation files (45 files,
with almost 900 slides).
- 640 min of video recording
from meetings, internal
communications, webinars,
and strategy discussions.
- Internal communications of
the OpenFog consortium.
- Cisco's blog.
- Cisco's annual reports,
2009–2019; Cisco's publicly
available histories of key
events associated with
Cloud and Fog
technologies, including
managers' appearances in
the media.
- Industry reports and analyst
report specific to Cisco and
OpenFog.
- To identify managers'
strategy frames across
different units and over
time.
- To identify major events
and strategic challenges.
- To gain additional
understanding of the
industrial context and
secure an outsider view
of the evolution of Cloud
and Fog computing.
Chronological analysis to
determine how Cisco's
platform strategies
evolved over time, how
platform objectives were
achieved and how the
perceptions of different
stakeholders changed
during this period.
- Quotations from reports
were coded for first- and
second-order constructs.
Interviews - First round, transcripts
(almost 850 pages) of
interviews conducted
between 2011 and 2013
with 32 senior managers
and professionals from
Cloud ecosystem actors.
- Second round, 6 discussion
sessions, 9 formal
interviews, and 32 informal
interviews, 2016–2019.
- First round, to understand
the context of the
industry, the drivers of
revenue decline in Cisco
and other similar
companies, and to
identify their strategic
responses.
- Second round, to achieve
a fine-grained
understanding of frames
and strategic issues.
Interviews were
transcribed and analyzed
for first- and
second-order constructs.
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feedback to increase the validity of our interpretations (Langley, 2007). Figure 2 reports the data
structure used to ground the core constructs. Online Appendix provides a table with representa-
tive data relating to our codes.
4 | FINDINGS
Our inductive study of platform creation strategy at Cisco reveals that this process can be
divided into two phases: seeding and building initial momentum for the platform and scaling
the platform. We also explore the period before and after the scaling stage. Our analysis sug-
gests that Cisco created an adjacent platform through both material and symbolic actions to
connect with and complement the established platform while also providing distinct value to
the new platform members.
4.1 | 2009–2013: A peripheral role in a dominant platform ecosystem
Before the rise of cloud computing, analysts had believed that Cisco's hardware infrastructure
(routers and switches) would become a commodity (TBR, several reports, 2007–2013). This was
due in part to the emergence of Chinese suppliers, who introduced similar products but at 30%
lower prices (Li Sun, 2009). Prior to 2013, despite revenue growth, Cisco's gross margin had
gradually diminished (see Figure 3) and its market cap had shrunk from $220 billion in 2002
(#1 globally) to $110 billion in 2013 (#43 globally) (Forbes Global 2000, 2018). The company
• Involving existing suppliers 
• Involving partners and allies
• Involving existing customers and users with strong needs or interest
• Discussing how fog computing brings the cloud closer to devices
• Using visuals to show the connection between the cloud and fog 
platforms
• Cisco-centered conferences and symposia
• Showcasing Fog technology at exhibitions
• Cisco communications forecasting the future growth of Fog
Internal Development
LEVERAGING THE 
FIRM’S RESOURCES 
• Discussing how fog computing addresses what cloud computing does 
not address
• Emphasizing on new applications not targeted by cloud providers
DEVELOPING 
EXCLUSIVITY
ASSEMBLING INITIAL 
MEMBERS
• Fog-enabling all Cisco products 
• Multibillion-dollar development 
• Creation of a new business unit
Exclusive Promotional Activities
Engaging Existing Partners
• Utilizing firm-specific terminology
• Communicating Cisco’s Fog strategy
• Cisco’s fog platform, IOx, made compatible with all Cisco products
• A range of complementary technologies and services
• Global IoT challenges
• Fog innovation centers across the globe
SIGNALLING 
COLLABORATION
Incentivizing Innovation
Exclusive Terminology
• Innovation and entrepreneurship activities revolving around fog 
computing
• Development aimed at addressing unmet needs and mission-critical 
applications
Complementarity Framing
Extension Framing
Developing Technological 
Infrastructure
Developing Initial Applications
• Cisco is considered the prime force behind the development of Fog
• Fog computing recognized as Cisco technology
• Industry reports forecast high growth for Cisco’s Fog
• Fog computing considered a key underlying technology of the IoT
Recognition of the Established Firm 
as Platform Champion
Recognition of the New Platform as 
a High-Potential Platform
ESTABLISHING 
LEADERSHIP IDENTITY
• Opening the platform to third-party actors
• Joint development projects
Consortium Activities
FOSTERING 
STANDARDIZATION & 
CO-DEVELOPMENTEmbracing Openness
• OpenFog Consortium established
• Participation in other consortia and standardization activities
FIGURE 2 Coding structure
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was thus under pressure from financial markets to show growth and increase its share price
(The Wall Street Journal, May 2011).
Cloud computing servers and data centers provided new business opportunities for Cisco,
but only as an infrastructure and hardware complementor; it was unable to capture a sizable
share of the booming Cloud business (IDC Research, 2018). Although Cisco made moves to
become a Cloud provider, its attempts were not successful, and in 2016 it had to abandon its $1
billion cloud project, Intercloud. Cisco's head of cloud marketing stated bluntly: “That ship has
sailed” (Network World.com, 2017).
While being left behind in Cloud was a major challenge for hardware companies, a silver
lining appeared for Cisco. The emergence of the IoT increased demand for processing power
closer to these connected devices, which exceeded the capacity of “generic” cloud computing
systems (de Brito, Hoque, Steinke, Willner, & Magedanz, 2018). In an interview, a senior Cisco
manager explained how this created an opportunity for Cisco:
by that time, 2014 roughly, a lot of people were getting into it [IoT] and started to
devote a whole lot of time [to it]. But it wasn't going anywhere very fast. […] We
started to realize that many people designing IoT solutions were playing within the
• Emphasizing the unique features of Fog not addressed by Cloud
• Emphasizing the advantages of Fog compared to Cloud 
BROADEN 
MEMBERSHIP
• Discussing instances that Fog may disrupt Cloud services
• Discussing a future where Fog will be the pervasive platform
SIGNALING 
COMPETITION
• Communicating that Cisco’s mission goes beyond Fog
• Communicatingthe importance of including different actors
RELINQUISHING 
EXCLUSIVITYStrategic Communication of 
Inclusivity
• Sharing the trademark for Fog computing
• Limiting official Fog-related communications to the OpenFog 
Consortium
Reduced Exclusivity in Trademarks 
and Promotions
• Major industryplayers join the consortium
• Some of Cisco’s main competitors join the consortium
Novelty Framing
Disruptive Framing
Powerful Complementors and 
Competitors
Universities and Standardization 
Bodies
• Important standardization bodies join the consortium
• Major universities around the globe begin to invest and join the 
consortium
• Cisco recognized as playing a central role in the OpenFog consortium
• Fog considered to be Cisco’s technology, even though there is no 
official sponsor
Recognition as a Keystone Player
Persistence of Influence over the 
Ecosystem 
LINGERING 
LEADERSHIP IDENTITY• Cisco terminology and concepts remain central to consortium 
communications
• Strong Cisco presence in the consortium’s board and communications
Perception that the New Platforms 
Competes with the Dominant One
CULTIVATING 
COMMENSALISM• Fog discussed as a competitor to Cloud in certain areas
• Fog discussed as a potential alternative to Cloud in certain areas
• Industry discussions that frame Fog as complementary to Cloud
• Cloud and Fog described as ‘perfect allies’
Perception that the New Platforms 
Complements the Dominant One CULTIVATING 
SYMBIOSIS• Cloud and Fog discussed as two connected and distinct platforms, 
addressing different needs 
• Fog computing discussed as an extension to cloud computing
Perception that the New Platforms 
Extends the Dominant One
FIGURE 2 (Continued)
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Revenues (B
USD)
Gross Margin
(Percent)
FIGURE 3 Cisco's revenue and
gross margin prior to initiation of Fog
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confines of the current computing mode [Cloud]. They were trying to use the cur-
rent method [Cloud] and force-feed them [methods] into IoT [applications].
Both Cloud and Edge technology providers tried to address the increased demand for
processing capacity, but faced challenges. Cloud providers struggled to cope with the increased
need for speed and security (e.g., Tan & Ai, 2011). For instance, in a self-driving car on a
crowded road, reducing latency by a few seconds could mean the difference between life and
death. Similarly, speed is critical in fast-moving robotic arms in factories or in heavy machinery
on oil rigs. Centralized Cloud computing was not ready yet for applications where data
processing needs were time-sensitive. In addition, managing data in cloud platforms like those
used to store patient data outside hospitals raises significant concerns about security and timely
availability. In the Cloud, it is not always possible to determine exactly where a piece of data is
stored, since information is constantly being shifted across the globe to balance the load on vari-
ous infrastructure components. This makes it difficult to determine who owns the data and can
claim jurisdiction over it, which is critical for organizations working with sensitive information
(e.g., defense contractors and healthcare bodies). While decentralized Edge computing was
capable of providing speed, security and accuracy proximate to devices and terminals, it was ill-
equipped to deal with massive data from numerous and dispersed devices. This created an
opportunity for Cisco to leverage its capabilities to address the emergent and unmet need for
processing power. To illustrate the value of Fog, a Cisco senior technology manager gave an
example of an oil rig in an ocean:
It's not feasible, economical or practical to take this data from out in the ocean and
send it to the cloud. Nor is it possible to manage all data needs at the Edge (rig) …
some larger oil rigs generate a couple of terabytes of data per day. So instead, you
take cloud services and extend them to an oil rig. That's where fog adds value.
Another Cisco executive explained: “Cisco has always been the connector—they really are
the bridge to the cloud to allow customers to move to and from the various cloud offerings. If
you don't have a reliable network, you can't get to [Amazon's] AWS or [Microsoft's] Azure”
(Interview with CRN technology analyst, 2019). Cisco was not alone in attempting to seize this
opportunity. The need for processing power closer to devices and data-generating locations also
created opportunities for hardware firms, such as GE, Ericsson, and Huawei. However, Cisco
offered a unique platform that was designed to seamlessly connect Cloud and Edge computing.
A strategy manager at Cisco noted:
they (Edge) don't integrate with the cloud well, they don't integrate with each other
well, and you're talking about basically, lots of proprietary things…And because
they're doing it all in isolated manner, they're trying to develop yet another sepa-
rate, isolated thing dedicated to the edge.
Thus, while the IoT promised many benefits, it needed other technologies to drive new
value for customers. A Cisco executive explained the shortcomings of Edge:
content distribution network (Edge) had been deployed and used all over the place
[…] people are starting to realize just moving content closer to users is not sufficient
any more. […] There were very, very siloed nodes […], they're totally isolated from
KHANAGHA ET AL. 11
the cloud […]. That means two separate computing platforms, two separate net-
works. They don't talk to each other, but they need to talk to each other.
Fog could fill this gap by connecting Cloud to Edge platforms and providing solutions such
as predictive insights into high-velocity live data streams generated from on-premises and
cloud data.
4.2 | 2013–2015: Initiating the fog computing platform and building
momentum
In 2013, Cisco decided to develop a technological platform and assemble an initial group of
users and complementors around it [CTO Forum, 2013]. As Cisco CEO John Chambers noted
at the time:
You're going to have your cloud, your data center, your wide area network, the
ability to deliver from that down to local areas [such as] a branch bank, a commu-
nity, an oil field[…]. We call that Fog. (Cisco 2013 CIO Summit).
The idea had been initiated two years earlier by Cisco researchers who believed that “com-
puting will not just be in the cloud” (Interview with Cisco strategy manager). They pushed the
idea of Fog computing internally for around 2 years before it became formally recognized as a
key technological trend for 2014 (Cisco Tech Radar, 2013). Cisco's initial efforts to build
momentum for the fog computing platform can be categorized into three types of activity:
(a) leveraging its capabilities and partner networks to create an adjacent technology platform
ecosystem; (b) establishing a distinctive identity in the nascent ecosystem; and (c) cultivating
perceptions of complementarity between fog and the pervasive cloud computing platforms.
4.2.1 | Leveraging resources to assemble initial membership
In 2014, Cisco introduced an expanded fog computing strategy and its IOx platform—an archi-
tecture to enable data analysis on routers (Cisco press release, October 2014). CEO John Cham-
bers articulated the vision for fog computing at a live event in San Francisco, claiming that the
fog platform would help Cisco emerge as the “Internet of Everything” leader and would reverse
the trend of commoditization:
A few years ago, there was talk of Huawei and Avaya and Juniper eating our
lunch…Nobody eats our lunch. (Cisco CEO, Cisco Live developer conference 2014).
Accordingly, Cisco invested heavily in IoT-related projects, providing $250 million to sup-
port start-ups (Cisco Newsroom, April 2014). It also expanded its fog-related activities (Cisco
press release, October 2014). This included adapting existing products to fit the requirements of
fog, developing new software, and creating a dedicated IoT business unit for fog computing.
A group of complementors joined Cisco in developing supporting technologies for fog
(Cisco press release, October 2014). Suppliers and collaborators such as Itron, Tieto, and ARM,
who had longstanding relationships with Cisco, adopted the fog terminology and developed
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technologies for the fog platform (Computer Weekly News, October 2014). Cisco also attracted
innovators from outside its network to help promote the new platform to users. It opened seven
innovation centers globally to encourage start-ups to develop applications based on fog comput-
ing (ENP Newswire, May 2014). In 2015, the firm announced a global IoT challenge, offering a
prize of $2.5 million for the top submissions in fog computing and related IoT areas (Dow Jones
Institutional News, May 2014). In collaboration with rail system operators, Cisco initiated pro-
jects to showcase the benefits of fog computing (M2 Presswire, November 2014). It also began
to collaborate with manufacturers around the world, including Toshiba, to incorporate fog tech-
nologies into their manufacturing processes (Daily Tribune, November 2014). To further pro-
mote the platform, Cisco guaranteed that it would integrate fog computing services with all of
its other offerings (Cisco press release, January 2015).
Fog's initial membership excluded Cisco's competitors and was limited to its close partners,
financially incentivized members of its innovation centers, and users with needs unmet by
cloud computing. Overall, at this stage Cisco exerted strong control over the design of the fog
platform.
4.2.2 | Developing exclusivity to establish a leadership identity
While other companies such as HP, Huawei, and Ericsson also were trying to develop alterna-
tive decentralized platforms, Cisco was one of the few (along with GE, with its Predix platform)
to develop firm-specific trademarks and terminology for their platforms. It trademarked the
“Cisco fog platform” in the US (Justia Trademarks, 2013) and other regions, including Australia
(Australian Government News, 2013), and allowed third parties to develop new applications for
the platform. During this period, several conferences on fog computing featured speakers
mostly from Cisco, and targeted participants from universities and business (Business Wire,
October 2014). In addition, Cisco participated in major industry exhibitions to showcase the
company's vision and its initial fog computing applications (Cisco blog, May 2014).
When unveiling its IoT systems at a corporate conference in 2015, Cisco predicted that “40%
of IoT-created data will be processed in the fog by 2018,” and also announced that “Over 25 of
Cisco's network products are enabled with Cisco's fog computing or edge data processing plat-
form, IOx.” (Cisco press release, June 2015). Such announcements were widely circulated in the
media, attracting users, complementors, and developers who attempted to make their offerings
compatible with the fog platform. Several research reports claimed that there would be expo-
nential growth in the demand for fog computing (ENP Newswire, June 2015). Overall, Cisco
promoted the term “fog” in a way that would enable people to recognize the technology plat-
form as being pioneered and driven by Cisco.
4.2.3 | Signaling complementarity and collaboration to cultivate
positive interdependence
Rather than positioning fog computing as an independent platform to rival cloud computing,
Cisco emphasized the close relationship between the two. The new platform's name clearly con-
veyed the connection with Cloud. Just as fog resides below the clouds, the fog platform was
designed to provide an interim stage of data processing a layer below the cloud computing plat-
form. The term fog seemed effective in serving Cisco's purpose by initially positioning this
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platform as a “perfect ally” (Yannuzzi, Milito, Serral-Gracià, Montero, & Nemirovsky, 2014)
and complement to cloud computing that could extend cloud computing to devices. A senior
director of technology development at Cisco explained the rationale for choosing the term:
[We chose fog] because everyone knows cloud and it's easy to explain even to my
non-technical people what fog is. Fog is bringing the very same elements of cloud
lower, where they are needed, thus a fog cloud vs. a high cloud. (OpenFog congress
documents, 2017).
A former Cisco executive explained to us that “fog can actually be viewed as extending cloud
[…] I would describe it as a stretching the cloud. And [getting] closer and closer down to Earth.”
He noted: “So the [Cisco] cloud people were searching for a strategy. We said, 'Here [Fog] is the
strategy'.” Cisco relentlessly promoted Fog as an extension of Cloud, even though many ana-
lysts considered it to be an alternative to it. One report stated, for example, that industry actors
may need to “forget about the cloud” because “the future of computing lies in the fog.” It was
argued that “asking our smart devices to, for example, send software updates to one another…
could make the fog a direct rival to the cloud for some functions.” The author of that report
went on to assert:
Stop focusing on the cloud, and start figuring out how to store and process the tor-
rent of data being generated by the Internet of Things…Marketers at Cisco Systems
Inc. have already come up with a name for this phenomenon: fog computing. (The
Wall Street Journal, May 2014).
This view, shared by many experts in the field, suggests that fog computing was an emerging
rival to cloud computing and that “cloud computing may concede to fog computing” (The
Nation, March 2015). However, Cisco relentlessly countered this claim through market commu-
nications and industry events to explain how fog computing complemented cloud computing
by addressing unmet user needs and providing mission-critical applications. Even in visual rep-
resentations of fog computing, a positive connection to cloud computing was always empha-
sized. An executive from Cisco explained to us:
Rather than cannibalizing cloud computing, fog computing enables a new breed of
applications and services, and there is a fruitful interplay between the cloud and
the fog, particularly when it comes to data management and analytics. (Interview
with senior executive).
During our field observations, we found no evidence to suggest that Cisco and its partners
had positioned fog computing as a threat to cloud computing. Industry analysts and thought
leaders took the view that that Fog was an extension to Cloud, not a rival. An academic at a
conference noted:
Fog does not replace cloud computing. It extends the cloud to the edges of the net-
work. If properly integrated, the resulting infrastructure would provide reduced
latency, geographic awareness, improved data streaming, and access to commodity
resource pools. (Twentieth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Savan-
nah, 2014).
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This approach allowed Cisco to maintain its position as a complementor in the cloud ecosys-
tem, which could have been undermined, had fog computing been framed as a rival or dis-
ruptor to cloud computing. In 2014, Cisco was perceived to have a “clear lead in public cloud
infrastructure,” with around 15% market share (Synergy Research Group, 2015). At the same
time, it started to emerge as a leader in the IoT landscape. An industry analyst noted:
“There was, for a time, significant doubt over – how exactly – Cisco would manage this mar-
ket transition. It was near on impossible for traditional vendors to compete with cloud-native
companies in an increasingly software dominated landscape. The Internet of Things hysteria
was exactly what Cisco needed to reverse its fortunes.” (MicroScope Research, 2016).
4.2.4 | Triggers of strategic changes
Although each of the three actions we have described were beneficial in seeding the platform,
they began to create scalability problems. First, there were limits to the number of members
and users that Cisco could enroll by mining its own network or providing direct incentives. As
indicated in a post on its blog, Cisco faced three important problems at that time: interoperabil-
ity issues concerning fog technologies and applications from various vendors, a need for collab-
oration and partnerships with vendors and academia, and a need for increased awareness of
Fog's benefits and applications in a wider set of industries. A Cisco technology manager
explained in an interview, “the problem was too complex to be handled by Cisco.” Expanding
the platform required incorporating other companies' technologies and involving players
beyond the initial membership. A company-specific technology platform was unlikely to attract
the resources and complements needed to scale up. A respondent explained:
It was time that we needed to rethink our strategy …this [Fog] was an industry-
wide thing, […] not just a Cisco thing. And it wasn't going well. First of all, it [Fog]
is too complicated and it involves a lot of companies and no single company will be
able to do it, and [second] it involves domain knowledge that no single company
will have. These issues were actually what triggered us to revitalize the effort.
Moreover, although developing a company-specific technology and securing centrality in a
platform ecosystem has significant benefits, it can also deter others averse to being locked into
a platform provided by a single (perhaps even rival) large company. In a contribution to a popu-
lar technology blog, Mike Kirkwood explained the challenge of using Cisco's name:
Like religion itself, Cisco is a company that evokes deep emotions. Many IT leaders
believe in Cisco and bet their operations on the company. And to unbelievers, using
Cisco gear is one of the deadly sins. (ReadWrite, February 2010).
Second, we observed that many companies did not want to participate in fog computing
because it was seen to be Cisco's exclusive technology. In an interview with us, a senior strategy
executive from a Cisco rival said that they had been warned against using Fog because it was
known to be a “Cisco term” [Interview with Head of IoT unit at a Cisco rival]. Although
owning the fog computing brand and having architectural control helped Cisco to attract an ini-
tial set of users to the new platform, it also limited its further expansion. Notably, the scientific
community did not participate actively in the fog platform, and industrial applications
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remained limited to those in which Cisco had made direct investments. Third, to expand
beyond the initial membership and attract more application developers required Cisco to focus
on opportunities that were also targeted by Cloud providers. A heavy focus on cultivating per-
ceptions of complementarity with Cloud during the seeding of the platform led to fog comput-
ing being perceived as redundant and nothing “new,” which impeded its future prospects.
4.3 | 2015–2018: Scaling the fog computing platform
The scaling stage of platform creation was dominated by three strategic actions: (a) fostering
standardization and codevelopment, (b) cultivating perceptions of distinctiveness, and
(c) relinquishing exclusiveness. These differed considerably from (and even contradicted) the
strategic actions taken during the platform seeding stage.
4.3.1 | Fostering standardization and codevelopment to encourage
broader membership
In 2015, Cisco began to redirect its efforts. To scale the platform and facilitate wider adoption,
Cisco ensured that its technological architecture was included in industry standards and in dis-
cussions with the scientific community. In a blog post, Cisco's senior technology manager
explains the rationale:
Our goal is to accelerate the deployment of fog technologies by developing an open
architecture and core technologies that can be leveraged across industries in many
different IoT scenarios. (Blog.cisco.com, November 2015).
Cisco began participating in industry groups such as the Wireless IoT Forum, which focused
on IoT standardization, as Cisco's chairman noted in his opening address in 2015: “Without
widely-agreed open standards, we risk seeing pockets of proprietary technology developing
independently, preventing the benefits of mass-market scale” (TechWorld, July 2015). With a
similar goal, Cisco established the OpenFog Consortium. A Cisco senior manager explained in
an interview with us:
We—a small team of Princeton academics and Cisco—met initially to discuss the
options and we realized that it was bigger than one company could do and one
company could handle. It needed a wider approach. We could not do this by
ourselves—we learned from cloud computing that you need more partners to make
it work. We decided to create a consortium and gradually more companies started
joining…Cisco had a trademark for ‘Cisco fog’ and that meant we could use
fog/OpenFog. (Interview with Cisco senior representative at OpenFog).
Major players, including ARM, Cisco, Dell, Intel, Microsoft Corp., and the Princeton
University Edge Laboratory, joined forces to develop the platform, and announced they would
be creating an architecture “that brings seamless intelligence from the cloud to the IoT end-
points using an open standardized approach” (EFY December 2015). In 2016, a Chinese firm,
ZTE, joined the consortium, thus broadening geographical participation in the platform (ZTE
16 KHANAGHA ET AL.
press release, 2016). State bodies like the U.S. Congress also recognized the importance of fog
computing (SEC Wire, May 2016). As the platform expanded, the OpenFog Consortium initi-
ated a geographical structure and established a country team in Japan (ibid). Cisco meanwhile
continued to deploy the platform, and showcased fog-related products in bi-monthly industry
events. It took part in urban management projects (e.g., a smart city initiative in Barcelona) to
promote fog computing (ENP Newswire, 2016).
During a presentation at the 2017 OpenFog World Congress, a Cisco manager explained
why the term “open” was added to the consortium's name: “Open is a given, since we have
taken a very cooperative approach toward working with and leveraging our bodies of work.
Also, we wanted a diverse group of members, including academic institutions, to help drive
innovation.” The standardization of fog computing was the key mission for Cisco and the other
members of the OpenFog Consortium. A Cisco senior manager told us: “You have hundreds of
legacy protocols and many competing standards. Our strategy is to build a complete portfolio to
drive standardization.” Another senior manager stressed the importance of user needs and
standardization:
We need to keep up the pace of new standards progress—we need to have frequent
focused deliverables so people who are under pressure to achieve value can get
that, and others who expect the right time also have that provided. (Interview with
Cisco strategy manager).
In April 2016, IEEE, the world's largest professional organization for technology advance-
ment with more than 423,000 members in over 160 countries, joined the consortium (IEEE offi-
cial announcement), a clear sign that the new platform was gaining attention in the scientific
community. The consortium established a framework for cooperative, open and interoperative
fog systems across AI, 5G, and IoT deployments. Research institutes and universities began
using fog technologies in their own R&D. In 2017, OpenFog released its Reference
Architecture—a framework aimed at promoting industry standards for fog computing
(OpenFog press release, June 2017). In 2018, OpenFog was embraced as IEEE 2018:1934 stan-
dard, becoming an industry standard and marking a major milestone in the Fog computing
initiative.
4.3.2 | Relinquishing exclusivity and relying on lasting recognition as
the platform leader
After many of Cisco's activities had been transferred to the OpenFog Consortium, the company
tried to widen the platform's scope by repositioning itself as a comprehensive provider of IoT
solutions. This shift in focus is reflected in Cisco's SVP response to a technology analyst:
You actually have heard a lot about fog computing, [but] we didn't want to be
associated with the fog company. But if you look at our announcements on, let's
say, data centers, Chuck [CEO] talked about moving from data centers to centers
of data. […] A lot of the things that we talked about, our Edge innovations, I
think we just haven't put the word fog on it. (CQ FD Disclosure, November
2015).
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In company communications, there were few signs of fog computing being promoted
beyond the activities of the OpenFog Consortium. Cisco's senior director explained in a presen-
tation at the 2017 OpenFog World Congress that they welcomed the multiple agendas of con-
sortium members:
[The] focus on commonalities minimized the differences. No tech religion. Focus
on the architecture, focus on things that are important to the industry as whole
such as openness and interoperability. Multiple ways to skin a cat, doesn't have to
be [from] a particular company's perspective.
Creating a shared trademark, OpenFog, helped to encourage broader membership of the
OpenFog Consortium. However, in our interactions in OpenFog meetings and discussions with
Cisco's rivals we noted that some major players such as Nokia and Ericsson still chose not to
participate, because they lacked control over the platform's architecture. Cisco, however, made
its own collaborative agreements with companies such as Ericsson to ensure alignment (Cisco
press release, November 2015) and strengthen Cisco's central role in the fog platform
ecosystem.
Even though Cisco had shared the Fog trademark with consortium members and
relinquished some of its control over the fog platform, industry experts continued to associate
OpenFog with Cisco (Forbes, 2016). During our conversations with field experts, they fre-
quently referred to Fog as Cisco's platform. For example, as late as 2018 and two years after the
Fog trademark had been abandoned, a reputable industry analyst still considered Fog to be part
of Cisco's technology portfolio:
Cisco is positioned as a leader in the IDC MarketScape for IoT platforms. Based in
San Jose, California, Cisco is a provider of networking, security, datacenter, and
collaboration solutions. Cisco's IoT portfolio includes edge and fog infrastructure…
(IDC report, 2018).
At this point, potential rivals became less averse to developing fog applications, because it
was no longer a company-specific technology. Even direct competitors such as Dell joined the
consortium.
4.3.3 | Signaling distinctiveness and competitiveness with Cloud
The OpenFog Consortium focused on defining the relationship between cloud and fog plat-
forms. Discussions at the OpenFog Atlanta Member Meeting (January 2018) were dedicated to
discussing Fog versus Cloud questions. In the beginning, and much as Cisco had done in 2013,
the consortium framed fog computing as complementary to cloud computing. However, the
consortium gradually started to emphasize the platform's strengths and its potential to shift
value from cloud-based business. For example, it claimed that Cloud was not meant for
IoT use:
Cloud networking is an extremely valuable architecture that has ushered in a pow-
erful new generation of computing for the 21st century. However, the Cloud was
designed for IT—not IoT. Distributed IoT networks across a variety of industries—
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discrete and process manufacturing, power and energy, utilities, connected cars,
and so on require operational efficiencies with zero downtime, ultra-low latency.
Plus, enormous data loads from billions of streaming devices requires processing
power that is closer in proximity to the ‘things.’ Fog computing fills this gap
between cloud and things. (openfogconsortium.org, December 2016).
To advance the idea that fog could also compete with Cloud, Cisco, and its partners identi-
fied and implemented applications where fog-based technology was replacing cloud-based tech-
nology (for example, in health informatics) (OpenFog news, 2018). These efforts were aimed at
fostering perceptions that fog could do some of the things that Cloud does, but more efficiently
and securely They also focused on distinguishing between fog and alternative concepts such as
“Edge” computing:
Fog computing also is often erroneously called edge computing, but there are key
differences. Fog works with the cloud, whereas edge is defined by the exclusion of
cloud. Fog is hierarchical, where Edge tends to be limited to a small number of
layers. In additional to computation, fog also addresses networking, storage, control
and acceleration. (OpenFog reference architecture document, 2016).
They claimed that Fog computing could ensure data collection and analysis at the most effi-
cient and logical places between the Edge and the Cloud. Thus, industry actors began to per-
ceive Fog as neither purely complementary to Cloud nor redundant, but as providing unique
value not offered by Cloud.
Fog computing's potential to disrupt the flourishing cloud computing model is
really about economics. As many people said at Fog World Congress, the volume of
data generated by edge devices is already in the zettabytes. That volume will
increase exponentially as more devices come online. And guess what? Most of that
data is junk. Transporting all of it up and down from cloud providers costs money.
Fog computing can help triage data, deduplicate redundant bits, and make the
cloud and edge more efficient. (the2112group.com, October 2018).
Figure 4 illuminates how Cisco initially framed Fog's relationship with Cloud computing
and how it later adopted a more competitive but nevertheless mutualistic approach, in which
Cloud and Fog needed to work in tandem to provide seamless connectivity in the computing
continuum.
By 2018, fog computing had become a major platform for developing IoT infrastructure
(Economist, 2018) involving academic institutions and governments. It was also adopted as an
IEEE industry standard (IEEE Standard Association, 2018).
In 2019, the platform ecosystem grew even bigger as the OpenFog consortium merged with
the Industrial Internet Consortium (IIC) of which Cisco was a founder member. “The Industrial
Internet Consortium and OpenFog Consortium have agreed in principle to bring the OpenFog
members into the IIC organization so that the Industrial Internet Consortium can continue the
progress OpenFog has made toward accelerating the adoption of fog computing” (IIC Website).
While Cisco is not leading this merged platform, it is recognized as a “visionary leader in the
IoT analytics space” which is helping to facilitate real-time governance and enable immediate
decision making (IDC Analysis, 2018). Fog computing still features prominently in numerous
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scientific articles and analysts' reports, even though parallel terms such as distributed cloud are
also becoming widespread. For example, in October 2019, the American Association of
Manufacturing (AEM) explained the way it looks at Fog:
The rise of the Internet of Things has sparked the emergence of the distributed
cloud, otherwise referred to as Cloud 2.0 or ‘fog computing’ defined by Cisco as a
‘highly virtualized platform that provides computing, storage and networking ser-
vices between end devices and traditional cloud computing data centers,’ its name
serves to explain how the technology works by alluding to the idea that fog is a
cloud that is close to the ground. (AEM website).
Hence, Cisco has connected Fog to one of the largest consortia with 258 members, even if at
the expense of not having Fog in the consortium's title. Fog continues to be deployed and
codeveloped by users and complementors and Cisco enjoys the position of being seen as one of
the key leaders in the vast IoT landscape (Bloomberg, October 9, 2019).
5 | A PROCESS MODEL OF NEW PLATFORM CREATION BY
AN ESTABLISHED FIRM
Building on our findings, we explain the key elements of an established firm's efforts to become
a leader in a new but adjacent platform ecosystem while safeguarding its position as a com-
plementor in an established platform ecosystem. This process is bounded by two conditions.
First, the process is less applicable in cases where it is not vital to enlist the support of powerful
actors in the existing platform. For example, Apple was able to establish its new mobile operat-
ing system without needing to gain legitimacy in the existing Symbian ecosystem on which it
had little dependence. Second, the established firm needs to have a stake in the existing plat-
form, even though its technological architecture and business model make it unlikely to
become a leader in that platform. This model is less applicable to a firm with few stakes in the
existing platform, or to a start-up that may need a more distinctive framing upfront to attract
attention, rather than beginning unobtrusively by emphasizing complementarity. See Figure 5
for a theoretical model of this process.
In a dominant platform ecosystem, an established firm, whose legacy business capabilities
do not allow it to gain centrality, can only support and complement the platform leaders.
Playing a complementor role may secure profitability but may limit the firm's ability to capture
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maximal value compared to platform leaders. However, when there are unmet user needs in
the existing platform ecosystem (Shah & Tripsas, 2007) and new opportunities arise (Agarwal,
Moeen, & Shah, 2017)—in our case, computing needs that are closer to connected devices and
that are not being fully served by Cloud—a firm may seize such opportunities to create an adja-
cent platform in which it plays a central role without relinquishing its complementor role.
However, in doing so it faces several strategic tensions, which can be addressed through
dynamic symbolic, material and institutional actions.
In the initial stage of platform creation, an aspiring platform leader focuses on leveraging its
resources (1A) to encourage allies and partners in the firm's existing network and attract users
with urgent unmet needs (e.g., high data security). Focusing on a select set of lead users and
complementors who are aligned with its own technical goals of enables the platform creator to
establish technical control over the platform architecture. At the same time, the firm develops
cultural resources such as familiar and recognizable labels and novel concepts (2A) to nurture a
distinctive leadership identity and gain mindshare among targeted adopters. At this point, users
and complementors tend to be less concerned about the exclusivity of the platform, and tight
control may not undermine its legitimacy. However, to safeguard its legitimacy in the existing
platform ecosystem where it still has stakes, the firm can signal conformance with it (3A) by
underlining complementarity (e.g., Fog as an extension of Cloud) to mitigate resistance from
targeted adopters who still value that platform. Showing such positive interdependence allows
the firm to gain legitimacy for the new platform while maintaining legitimacy in the existing
ecosystem. The platform sponsor's overall approach at this stage is symbiotic, even though it is
developing a high degree of technical control and a distinctive leadership signature.
While these strategies may work in the initial phase, they can also impede further expan-
sion. First, late adopters who are not part of the firm's existing network (or even the firm's com-
petitors) may be deterred by the firm's attempts to establish control and exclusivity. Second,
continuing to conform with the existing platform may make it difficult to attract a more diverse
set of members whose needs are not being met. However, having gained momentum, the new
platform can now emphasize nonoverlapping aspects (e.g., Fog as a replacement for Cloud),
rather than merely on its complementarity, and it can now even be framed as a viable alterna-
tive to the dominant platform.
Thus, in the scaling stage the firm shifts strategies and starts to promote standardization
and codevelopment (1B) to attract a broader membership. Achieving this goal requires the firm
to relinquish exclusive control over the platform's architecture and trademark (2B).
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Nonetheless, the distinctive leadership identity or founder stamp established initially may not
erode instantly, and its carryover effect (as with Cisco's Fog) may continue to benefit the firm if
it is still seen as the new platform's pioneer. At the same time, the firm needs to differentiate
the new platform from the dominant industry platform (3B) and frame it as a potential rival to
that platform. Opening up the platform and fostering standardization and codevelopment
enables the platform to attract late adopters, who value openness and inclusiveness; having
gained a footing, the firm can now also afford to more brazenly differentiate the platform. The
overall stance at this stage becomes more competitive, despite the opening up of the platform.
However, the firm still maintains a mutualistic approach toward the dominant platform by con-
tinuing to serve and enhance it. Thus, to create a new platform while remaining dependent on
an established platform, a firm needs to achieve a dynamic balance between the shifting legiti-
macy demands in the two ecosystems as technologies, competition, complementors, and user
needs evolve, and to continually adapt its strategies to meet these changing demands.
5.1 | Wider implications of our model
While our study was based on a single case, our process model may be relevant in many other
instances where former industry leaders have lost ground to thriving new platforms. Our model
offers a way in which these incumbents can respond to dominant platforms (Cozzolino
et al., 2018) by creating a new platform without undermining them. One such example is the
WiMAX internet connectivity platform championed by Intel to offer long-range connectivity for
mobile users (Burgelman, LaBrecque, & Schifrin, 2010; Holgersson, Granstrand, &
Bogers, 2018). Although attempts were being made to provide long-range internet access using
cellular technologies (e.g., LTE), Intel was not a key player in those initiatives. It thus decided
to leverage computer-based wireless technologies (Leiponen, 2008) to develop an alternative
platform, WiMAX, in line with its core capabilities and product portfolio. At the same time,
Intel strove to secure legitimacy both in the existing cellular ecosystem, in which it had a
peripheral role, and in the emerging WiMAX ecosystem, where it emphasized advantages such
as flexibility, shorter time to market, and lower costs. In line with the premises of our model,
Intel initially framed WiMAX as complementary to the dominant cellular platform ecosystem
by emphasizing nonoverlapping value such as the possibility of using it in isolated communities
or in business with dated internal communication systems. However, after gaining initial
momentum, it switched to commensalism by emphasizing the distinctive features of its own
platform and indicating that WiMAX could be a partial substitute for LTE. In 2008, Intel's CTO
said that “WiMAX is here now to meet that demand. LTE is at least 2-3 years away,” and
emphasized its distinctive features such as the platform's openness and cost effectiveness
(Blogs.Intel.com). At the same time, he assured to stakeholders that Intel's support for LTE.
Within the WiMAX ecosystem, Intel retained control as vital technology provider but engaged
in institutional efforts to gradually shift part of the platform development to the WiMAX forum.
At the same time, Intel developed a leadership identity as the prime advocate for WiMAX at
industry symposia. This enabled it to be seen as WiMAX's champion, despite relinquishing con-
trol to the WiMAX forum and letting other companies such as Motorola and Samsung contrib-
ute to the WiMAX initiative. Even though WiMAX ultimately failed to replace 3G, it shows
how a platform creator can make dynamic use of a mutualistic approach to gain legitimacy for
its new platform while also maintaining legitimacy in the existing platform ecosystem.
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Another example is the development of LiFi by Philips Hue to provide short range internet
connectivity segment that was dominated by WiFi technology. Having lost its competitive edge
in lighting systems, Philips found an opportunity to leverage its competence to develop an alter-
native platform, LiFi, which uses light to send wireless signals. As the visible light spectrum is
10,000 times larger than the radio frequency spectrum used by WiFi, LiFi offers higher capacity
for data transmission and can provide internet access in places sensitive to interference by radio
waves such as hospitals and airplanes. In creating this technology platform, Philips attempted
to secure legitimacy both in the existing WiFi ecosystem, where it needed buy-in from telecoms
and technology providers (e.g., KPN, Vodafone, and Orange), and with other players in the
emerging LiFi ecosystem (e.g., Atea, Samsung, and Panasonic). As per our model, Philips ini-
tially framed LiFi as complementary to the dominant WiFi platform ecosystem, as Philips Hue's
CEO explained: “Usage of Li-Fi is ideal in radio frequency sensitive areas, like hospitals, clinics,
factories, and schools, or areas with poor or no Wi-Fi connection at all” (LEDs Magazine,
February 2019). However, now that LiFi has gained traction, the firm is switching to address
the broader WiFi market; its focus is on leveraging LiFi's distinctive features to provide partly
overlapping value, even though it is still underscoring the positive interdependence between
the two, for example by promoting hybrid WiFi/LiFi systems.
6 | DISCUSSION
The increasing pervasiveness of platforms has either disadvantaged or displaced many incum-
bents in a range of industries (e.g., Eisenmann et al., 2011). We examined how an established
firm, which played only a complementor role in a thriving platform ecosystem and was under
market pressure to demonstrate new opportunities for growth, was able to reposition itself.
While unmet needs in a dominant platform category may encourage lagging incumbents to try
to reposition themselves, prior commitments may impede such moves (Wang & Shaver, 2014).
In our case, Cisco repositioned itself by establishing a new platform to gain market leadership
without losing its legitimacy in the existing ecosystem. Such repositioning requires a firm to
manage dual legitimacy and to navigate skillfully the shifting strategic tensions that arise in the
process (Claussen, Essling, & Kretschmer, 2015; Dattée, Alexy, & Autio, 2018). It has not only
to dynamically adapt material and symbolic actions, it must also attempt to shape the platform's
coevolution by coordinating ecosystem partners and getting them to coalesce.
6.1 | Dynamic strategies to manage dual legitimacy
Our study reveals the use of a three-pronged approach to platform development. First, adoption
is encouraged through material strategies such as building backward compatibility
(Kretchmer & Claussen, 2016), embedding design features, creating an open architecture, and
offering financial incentives (Evans, Hagiu, & Schmalensee, 2006; Van Alstyne et al., 2016). Sec-
ond, symbolic strategies such as framing (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015; Snihur et al., 2018) are used to
cultivate favorable perceptions among key stakeholders (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Vasudeva,
Alexander, & Jones, 2014), and developing cultural resources such as stories, analogies, labels
and novel concepts creates a distinctive identity. Third, institutional strategies such as forming
industry consortia to enroll other firms into the platform ecosystem are used to expand the plat-
form. While the use of material and symbolic strategies in combination is well established
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(e.g., Zott & Huy, 2007), our study shows not only how a firm used such strategies variably over
time, but also how it deployed them on a compensatory basis when seeding and scaling the
platform. It also shows how the firm sought to strengthen the ecosystem by encouraging the
creation of industry-wide standards in order to steer the future evolution of the platform
(Delcamp & Leiponen, 2014; Vakili, 2016).
These strategies suggest the benefits of a mutualistic approach to new platform creation. By
assuring other players in the dominant platform that the relationship will be one of symbiotic
mutualism—(eating from different tables)—that is, a relationship in which new platform pro-
vides distinct but nonoverlapping value to a niche not served by the dominant platform—the
platform creator can safeguard its new platform from hostile reactions. By invoking frames that
suggest complementarity (e.g., Philips Hue framing the LiFi platform as one that addresses
WiFi blind spots without posing a threat to WiFi itself) or by pursuing new market spaces that
are not being targeted by the dominant platforms (e.g., Atos framing its FinTech platform as
one that complements rather than competes with banks), key actors in a new ecosystem may
avoid head-to-head competition. This is thus in line with a symbiotic approach.
While a symbiotic approach is effective for legitimizing a platform in the early phases,
growth opportunities may begin to overlap with the areas being targeted by established plat-
forms. A new platform may then pursue commensalism or “eating from the same table”
(Hawley, 1950: 39) provided that the table is now large enough (Dobrev & Kim, 2006). Com-
mensalism is in part competitive, in that both platforms are addressing partly overlapping mar-
ket niches, but it does not necessarily imply predatory competition (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006).
There is room for platforms to serve a larger market and enhance each another. For example,
Fog and Cloud partly compete but also extend each other's reach. This switching from symbio-
sis to commensalism (i.e., from collaborative to partly competitive behaviors) while still
maintaining positive interdependencies highlights the often “overlooked” temporal dynamics of
coopetition (Hoffmann, Lavie, Reuer, Shipilov, 2018); these vary over time as the platform evo-
lves and are manifested not just within a single ecosystem but also across adjacent ecosystems.
Although a dynamic mix of material, symbolic, and institutional strategies may enable a
platform creator to navigate the challenge of dual legitimacy, it is still vulnerable to counterat-
tacks once the new and the existing platform begin to compete in overlapping markets
(Eisenmann et al., 2011). However, potential contenders may be constrained by the mismatch
between their capabilities and the new platform's architecture (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2018;
Moeen, 2017). For example, AWS does not have the same installed base of sensors and hard-
ware expertise to draw on as Cisco. Competing with a network of firms such as a consortium
may also be much harder than competing with a lone firm.
6.2 | Contributions
Given the increasing complexity of digital ecosystems and the associated challenges of esta-
blishing legitimacy for a new platform, firms need approaches other than pure competition.
Ecological concepts (e.g., Moore, 1993, p. 97) can further a coopetitive approach in interrelated
ecosystems. By showing how a firm may take a dynamic approach to new platform creation
when another platform is already dominant, and by focusing on mutualism based on non-
overlapping value (symbiosis) and on partly overlapping value (commensalism), we make three
contributions to the literature on platform ecosystems and strategic management. First, we
reveal how an established incumbent repositions itself (Wang & Shaver, 2014) by creating a
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new platform ecosystem in which it becomes a leader, without trying to beat its rivals. It does
so by using temporally variant and at times contrasting strategies that are rooted in a mutualis-
tic “rising tide lifts all boats” approach (Chen & Miller, 2015) of collective value creation, rather
than purely competitive, or even hostile, strategies such as “envelopment” (Eisenmann
et al., 2011) and “forking” (Karhu, Gustafsson, & Lyytinen, 2018). In contrast to studies
(e.g., Zhu & Iansiti, 2012) that focused on competitive dynamics and predatory strategies, we
set out an alternative path that is rooted in positive resource interdependences across platform
ecosystems.
Second, while participating in multiple platform ecosystems simultaneously is a challenge
in itself—as in “multihoming,” (Cennamo, Ozalp, & Kretschmer, 2018)—attempting to lead a
new platform while still being dependent on actors in the existing platform requires legitimacy
in both ecosystems. Navigating dual legitimacy involves a series of balancing acts: differentiat-
ing and conforming, asserting and surrendering control, and collaborating and competing with
the existing platform at different stages in the new platform's evolution. Differentiation has
been argued to provide a way of avoiding ambiguous competitive positioning (Cennamo &
Santalo, 2013). However, we suggest that when platform creators are faced with dual legitimacy
issues, they need to focus on both differentiation and conformance and to seek optimal distinc-
tiveness (Zhao et al., 2017) at various stages in order to address the changing needs of stake-
holders (e.g., early and late adopters) and shifting legitimacy criteria in the ecosystem
(Rietveld & Eggers, 2018; Überbacher, 2014).
Third, our findings offer a processual perspective on platform creation (Bower &
Gilbert, 2005; Burgelman et al., 2018; Dattée et al., 2018; Mintzberg, 1978) by showing how
organizations use compensatory material and symbolic strategies to address changes in user
needs, technology, and the nature of tensions. Potential loss of legitimacy arising from material
actions to establish a novel alternative to an existing value paradigm can be offset by using con-
current symbolic actions that signal complementarity with it (e.g., Poole & Van de Ven, 1989).
However, even when a shift is made to strategies that seem divergent (e.g., relinquishing exclu-
sivity but becoming competitive), cognitive carryovers from the earlier stage can create compen-
satory effects (e.g., Gulati & Puranam, 2009). For instance, creating mindshare initially by
establishing a distinctive leadership identity can later enable the platform creator to benefit
from cognitive continuity (Wittman, 2019) by being seen as a leading proponent, even after
relinquishing control over the architecture and brand. Deploying a unique mix of compensatory
material and symbolic strategies that temper each other's negative effects enables the platform
creator to open up the platform but still retain control.
In terms of how a platform creator navigates the open/closed tension, which entails
tradeoffs between adoption and appropriability (West, 2003), our findings suggest that it may
consider adopting a closed architecture initially (Toh & Miller, 2017) to steer the platform's
technological development (Leiponen, 2008) and may then “surrender” part of the control
(Alexy, West, Klapper, & Reitzig, 2018; Schilling, 2009; Van Alstyne et al., 2016). While it has
been argued that opening up a platform increases adoption by target members
(Boudreau, 2010), we show how simply granting access to the platform encourages complemen-
tary development but may not be enough to attract wider membership, particularly when an
industry-wide standard is at stake. The platform creator may then need to surrender control
over the platform itself and get others to coalesce around it.
Our study also offers insights for practitioners. Few companies, if any, can afford to go it
alone in industries that are becoming increasingly complex; they may therefore want to con-
sider taking nonrivalrous approaches such as pooling resources, enabling interoperability,
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ensuring seamless linkages among products and services, building consortia, and using other
collaborative means to cocreate and capture value. Our approach has relevance for incumbents
such as Ericsson, IBM and GE that have lost territory to increasingly dominant platforms. For
example, TomTom, having lost its leadership in satellite navigation to companies such as
Google, has arguably adopted a mutualistic approach vis-à-vis the dominant platforms by
addressing underserved market niches in specialized navigation systems. Its system comple-
ments existing platforms (symbiosis) but also partly competes with them (commensalism). Also,
failing to establish a distinctive leadership identity upfront may thwart subsequent attempts to
become a leader. For instance, Ericsson has sought prominence in IoT ever since it introduced
its DCP platform in 2013 but arguably is still not seen as central in the ecosystem, in part
because of its failure to create a platform leadership identity.
Our study provides some fruitful avenues for further research. For instance, our processual
view can illuminate how firms temporally manage ambidexterity (Knight & Paroutis, 2017;
Raisch & Zimmermann, 2017). Scholars can also examine the interplay between multi-firm net-
works and firm-centric resources (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011) and how this may generate
novel forms of organizing within and across firm boundaries. With regard to policy makers,
they may consider encouraging conditions that are conducive to symbiosis in order to nurture
multiple platform ecosystems and that discourage monopolistic winner-takes-all approaches
that have come under criticism.
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